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ORGANISING PROFESSIONALS AND THEIR IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE:  
THE CASE OF PUBLIC HEALTH DOCTORS IN THE ITALIAN SSN 
 
Abstract  
Hybrid professional managers have been associated with improvements in the performance of 
public sector organisations. However, less attention has been given to differences within this 
category. Drawing on board human capital theory, we focus on an emerging group of ‘organising 
professionals’ with earlier and deeper exposure to management training and education: generalist 
clinical hybrids drawn from public health in the Italian healthcare system. Specifically, we 
investigate the impact that these hybrid hospital CEOs have on organisational performance in 
comparison with other backgrounds. The results indicate that this form of generalist hybrid 
professionalism has distinct, if not dramatic, consequences for performance. 
KEYWORDS: Hybrid Professional Managers, Performance, Healthcare, Italy. 
 
Introduction 
In many countries, the reform of public services has focused on increasing the involvement of 
professionals, such as doctors, nurses and teachers in management (Dent et al. 2016). This has led 
to the creation of new part time or ‘hybrid’ professional manager roles such as clinical directors 
and, at more strategic levels, membership of governing boards as well as investments in leadership 
and management training and education for professionals (O’Reilly and Reed 2010). In healthcare, 
for example, there has been a sustained focus on developing clinical leadership, which has moved 
from ‘the dark side to centre stage’ (Ham et al. 2011). Policy makers assume that these changes will 
ultimately raise the performance of public sector organisations, with professionals (such as doctors) 
enhancing decision making through their sector specific knowledge and greater credibility. As 
Falcone and Satiani (2008, 88) suggest, ‘in a healthcare system that is complex, troubled, and 
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challenging, the doctor CEOs and board directors brings a unique set of skills to the business of 
medicine’.  
A growing number of studies have explored these claims by focusing on the performance 
implications of hybrid professional managers, especially at strategic levels (membership of boards) 
(Goodall and Bäker 2015). In healthcare, the results of this research have been mixed, with some 
studies finding strong associations with quality outcomes (such as mortality rates and patient 
experience) and others noting how clinical involvement may have negative consequences for 
efficiency (see Sarto and Veronesi 2016 for a review). However, to date less attention has been 
given to differences between types of hybrid professional managers. The available research notes 
significant variations in how professionals respond to management roles, in terms of emergent 
identities and practices (Spyridonidis and Currie 2016; Scott et al. 2016). This literature also 
highlights variations in the level of prior training, development and socialisation experienced by 
these hybrid professional managers (Noordegraaf et al. 2016). As we noted above, in areas such as 
healthcare, significant investments have been made to develop clinical leadership capabilities 
(Noordegraaf 2011a). In some countries, including the US, Australia, Israel and Italy, this has also 
gone closely together with moves to introduce more specialised career tracks in areas such as 
education or medical management (Busari et al. 2011). But what difference do these investments 
make to the impact that hybrid professional managers have on decision-making? Are those 
professionals who have undergone specific management training and education more effective than 
those who have not, perhaps because they are better able to balance demands associated with 
service quality and efficiency?  
Our goal is to address these questions about the relative impact of hybrid professional 
managers with different levels of prior management development and socialisation. Drawing on 
ideas from board human capital theory (Kor and Sundaramurthy 2009; Datta and Iskandar‐Datta 
2014), we make a distinction between hybrids with specialist and more generalist expertise. While 
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the former tend to enter these roles in late career with limited (if any) training in management, the 
latter are similar to what Noordegraaf (2015) has termed ‘organising professionals’, with deeper 
and earlier exposure to management development and socialisation.  
In the main part of the paper we explore these concerns empirically, focusing on the case of 
public hospital CEOs in the Italian Servizio Sanitario Nazionale (SSN). Italy is theoretically 
interesting because - unlike many other health systems - it witnessed the early development of a 
sub-specialisation of medical (hybrid professional) managers drawn from the public health (PH) 
specialty. Since the 1950s, PH doctors (also called hygienists - igienisti) have engaged in an explicit 
occupational mobility project aimed at capturing the jurisdiction of public hospital management 
(Sartirana et al. 2014). As such, the Italian case illustrates the development of a cadre of generalist 
organising professionals who are playing an increasingly significant role in the management and 
governance of hospitals. Using routine administrative data sources, we investigate three main 
hypotheses by testing the impact that hospital CEOs with different professional backgrounds have 
on (quality and financial) performance goals. The results of the analysis confirm existing 
assumptions about the impact of clinical hybrids overall, but also reveal the distinctive impact that 
generalist clinical hybrid CEOs (or organising professionals) are having on organisational 
performance. 
 
Hybrid professional managers and their impact on performance 
In recent years, the notion of hybridity has been used widely in the public management literature to 
describe change at multiple levels of analysis: individual, organisational and institutional (Denis et 
al. 2015). The term is imported from biology to refer to a ‘state of being composed through a 
mixture of disparate parts’ (Battilana and Lee 2014, 400), relatively stable over time. In this regard, 
hybrid professional manager roles are essentially about the blurring of logics and modes of working 
at individual levels, within organisational contexts such as public hospitals, universities and 
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professional service firms (Empson et al. 2015). Considerable research has been conducted on these 
roles, exploring variations in how professionals respond to them and consequences for practice. For 
instance, an influential strand of work focuses on identity struggles and distinctions in how 
professionals in different settings engage with management priorities and seek either to buffer or 
control the work of junior colleagues (Croft et al. 2015; McGivern et al. 2015).  
As noted earlier, there are strong reasons to assume that the presence of hybrid professional 
managers (doctors and other clinicians), especially at the board level of hospitals, including CEO 
roles, will have positive consequences for the core goals of healthcare including clinical and process 
quality. Here, an important source of reference are ideas from board human capital theory (Kor and 
Sundaramurthy 2009). A central tenet of this approach is that unique managerial capabilities of 
executives will influence decision making and subsequent performance. Frequently, distinctions are 
made between human capital that is either ‘generic’ or ‘industry/sector specific’ (Sundaramurthy et 
al. 2014). In the context of public services, this might capture differences between managers drawn 
from the commercial sector (with generic expertise) and professionals (including hybrids) who have 
advanced their careers exclusively within public organisations (Kirkpatrick et al. 2017). These 
differences might also have implications for ‘increased understanding and credibility and better 
communication’ (Dorgan et al. 2010, 14). Greater understanding arises from the knowledge and 
training of clinicians, giving them significant informational advantages over non-clinical (or 
general) managers in decisions regarding patient care and service development (Ford-Eickhoff et al. 
2011). In addition, CEOs or board members with clinical backgrounds may benefit from enhanced 
credibility, making it easier for them to communicate policies to rank and file professionals while 
ensuring greater engagement and implementation (Spurgeon and Clark 2017).  
These assumptions about the contribution of hybrid clinical managers at board level are 
supported by some emerging research (Goodall and Bäker 2015). Hence, Jiang et al. (2009) show 
how greater doctor participation on hospital committees improves performance in terms of the care 
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process (measured as quality of care of heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, and surgical infection 
prevention) and mortality rates. Focusing on the top 100 US hospitals, Goodall (2011) also finds 
that having a CEO with a medical background generates greater quality improvements and results in 
higher hospital rankings. More recently, similar results have been reported in the English NHS, 
where it appears that having a greater proportion of doctors on the governing boards of English 
hospital trusts can generate improved quality ratings and enhanced patient experience (Veronesi et 
al. 2013). Therefore, it seems reasonable to predict that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Clinical hybrids on the governing board of hospitals will have a positive impact on 
core service quality outcomes.  
 
Notwithstanding this hypothesis, it is less clear whether the presence of clinical hybrids on 
hospital boards will have positive implications for other performance goals, notably those of 
financial efficiency. On the one hand, it might be argued that the greater credibility of clinical 
hybrids (Falcone and Satiani 2008) will make it easier for them to ‘enter discussions with the 
medical staff about the hospital’s efforts to contain costs without raising concerns that proposed 
changes will adversely affect hospital quality’ (Succi and Alexander 1999, 35). Against this 
assumption is the limited training of most clinical hybrids in financial management (Kippist and 
Fitzgerald 2009) and, in some cases, a reluctance to engage with these concerns. The latter may 
arise from a ‘wariness of managerial work’ that ‘is deeply rooted in the culture of medicine and 
medical education’ (Blumenthal et al. 2012, 515 – quoted in Noordegraaf et al. 2016). Others note 
moral hazards and risks associated with clinical hybrids, especially when they behave as advocates 
or ambassadors of their own specialisms at the expense of the wider organisational priorities 
(Addicott 2008). These concerns are reflected in the available empirical research. While some 
studies have found that medical involvement on hospital boards is associated with marginal 
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improvements in efficiency (Sarto and Veronesi 2015), others report a significant negative impact 
(Succi and Alexander 1999). As such we can further predict that:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Clinical hybrids on the governing board of hospitals are unlikely to have a positive 
impact on financial efficiency outcomes. 
 
Returning to the themes raised in the introduction, much of the literature identifies different 
forms that hybrid roles can take and in the background and expertise of hybrids. Focusing on 
independent treatment centres in the UK, Waring and Bishop (2013) distinguish between 
professionals with expertise that is commercially valuable (so called ‘corporate elites’) and other 
practicing professionals. This dimension also captures the extent to which professionals in hybrid 
roles have experienced prior formal training and on the job socialisation in management. While 
such differences are especially pronounced between professions - see for example, Currie and 
Spyridonidis (2016) comparing nurses and doctors in management - they are increasingly present 
within professions as well (Noordegraaf et al. 2016). 
These variations between hybrids are explained in part by growing investments in leadership 
and management training and education for professionals (O’Reilly and Reed 2010). Also relevant 
here is the emergence of new types of sub-specialisms (Busari et al. 2011) in which professional 
and management competencies (and identities) are merged from the outset. For instance, in 
Australia and New Zealand, the specialty of medical administration is a postgraduate specialist 
branch of medicine promoted by the Royal Australasian College of Medical Administrators in order 
to prepare doctors for careers in healthcare management (MacCarrick 2014). In the US, attempts to 
build medical management sub-specialisms through joint degrees such as MD/MBA are also long 
standing (Larson et al. 2003).  
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Once again, ideas from board human capital theory might be useful for making sense of 
these differences in the backgrounds of hybrids (Kor and Sundaramurthy 2009). While noting 
differences between ‘generic’ or ‘industry/sector specific’ human capital (see above), this approach 
also makes further distinctions between ‘specialists’ and ‘generalists’ (Datta and Iskandar‐Datta 
2014). In the context of private sector boards, specialists are those directors with ‘deep expertise’ in 
a given ‘functional area’ (such as accounting). By contrast, generalists are defined as ‘those who 
earned [for example] an MBA degree’ which ‘imparts a broader, strategic knowledge-base’ (p. 
1854). This latter distinction is particularly relevant to the emergence of hybrid professional 
manager roles. Crudely speaking, specialists are those hybrids whose expertise is primarily 
professional (such as medicine or teaching) and have taken on these roles in late career. By contrast, 
generalists are hybrids who have undergone significant management training, similar to what 
Noordegraaf (2011b, 2015) terms ‘organising professions’. According to Noordegraaf, the latter 
represent a form of ‘re-configured’ professionalism in which the techniques and objectives of 
organisations (i.e. management) are more closely integrated. In areas such as medicine, this means 
that ‘organizational skills’ are not viewed as ‘separate from medical work’, but rather, ‘part of 
medical work’ (Noordegraaf et al. 2016, 1113).  
But what difference (if any) will these distinctions have for understanding the impact of 
hybrid clinical managers? A key rationale of investments in training and development – to develop 
organising professionals - is that it may lead to enhanced performance. In part this is explained by 
the reasons explored above in relation to Hypothesis 1. As clinicians themselves, organising 
professionals should be able to leverage specific knowledge and credibility in ways which improve 
board level decisions about clinical and process quality. In addition, it is possible that clinical 
hybrids with a more generalist training will also be able to contribute towards other goals, including 
efficiency. This assumption is central to the board human capital literature. According to Datta and 
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Iskandar‐Datta (2014, 1856): ‘CEOs with a general management experience tend to have expertise 
of greater strategic relevance than those with specific functional expertise’.  
The specific literature on hybrids also suggests that the ‘development of organizing 
capacities and skills’ will lead to a wider awareness and engagement with financial priorities (Scott 
et al. 2016, 604). This could ensure that generalist hybrids are more adept at dealing with ‘cost-
quality trade-offs’ (Weiner et al. 1997). In addition, the orientation and motivation of generalist 
hybrids who have self-selected into careers that involve management and leadership are potentially 
critical. Following McGivern et al. (2015), these professionals are more likely to be ‘willing 
hybrids’, with a stronger commitment to organisational interests over and above those of a 
particular speciality or profession. Hence, our final hypothesis states that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Generalist clinical hybrids on the governing board of hospitals will contribute 
positively to both service quality and financial efficiency outcomes.  
 
Research setting: Hybrid clinical managers in Italy 
Like other European healthcare systems, in Italy there has been an emphasis on strengthening 
clinical leadership and involvement in management. A key piece of legislation in 1992 allowed 
some public hospitals the opportunity to convert to semi-independent enterprises with a private 
sector-style governance (CEO and board) structure and actively promoted clinical directorates, 
which later became mandatory in 1999 (Lega 2008). As elsewhere, these reforms were associated 
with a growing number of hospital CEO positions being filled by clinical professionals, especially 
doctors (see below).  
However, as noted earlier, Italy also represents a critical case of the development of an 
organising profession (with more generalist human capital) in the healthcare sector. Unlike most 
other countries, from the early twentieth century doctors specialised in PH became prominent as 
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medical directors in hospitals and, in the post war era, actively sought to extend their jurisdiction 
into management, through new forms of training and specialisation (see TABLE 1 for a summary). 
Importantly, the government was supportive of this strategy, as this meant capitalising on the 
willingness of a specific professional category to occupy the emerging hospital managerial 
positions. Indeed, in the first half of the twentieth century, although primarily focused on the 
prevention of infectious diseases, PH doctors began to take on administrative roles in healthcare 
organisations (Sartirana et al. 2014).  
This process was given a boost in 1938 when the Petragnani Law (Legge Petragnani, R.D. 
1631/1938) restructured the hospital sector and established the new role of hospital medical director 
(i.e. Direttore Sanitario). Importantly, and possibly unique to Italy, this law insisted that, in order to 
compete for these positions, doctors should have had specific qualifications in the field of hygiene, 
technology and hospital care (Sartirana et al. 2014). Thus, the government intentionally selected PH 
doctors and not other types of clinical disciplines as their expertise was considered the closest to the 
developing organisational logics. This affinity placed PH doctors in an advantageous spot, allowing 
them to colonise the new positions of medical director compared to the other types of doctors who, 
in the main, were not interested in occupying these roles but remained committed to clinical 
practice (Nante et al. 2013). 
TABLE 1 HERE 
In the 1990s, the advent of New Public Management (NPM) reforms in Italy (Lega 2008) 
further re-affirmed the prominent role of PH doctors in occupying top management positions. This 
was especially the case after the creation in 1992 of semi-independent organisations - Aziende 
Sanitarie Locali (Local Health Organisations) and Aziende Ospedaliere (Hospital Trusts) - with 
corporate style governing boards (Sartirana et al. 2014). At that point, it was made clear that the 
specialisation in PH was a preferred qualification for the access of clinical professionals to senior 
board roles: general director (Direttore Generale) and medical director (D.lgs. 502/1992, D.lgs. 
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517/1999 and D.P.R. 10/12/1997 n. 484). To support this reform, in 1995 a uniformed, standardised 
curriculum for PH doctors was agreed, with particular emphasis on organisational competence and 
managerial skills (e.g. human resource management, management of processes, planning and 
evaluation) (Romano et al. 2014). 
By 2014, the number of university courses awarding the PH specialisation had reached 38 
(Romano et al. 2014). Crucially, a significant proportion of these students had the aspiration to 
move into senior management positions rather than pursuing a clinical career. As a consequence, 
PH doctors make up over 50 per cent of general director (or CEOs) roles with a medical 
background (Sartirana et al. 2014). The interest in management of these organised professionals has 
also been reinforced by the establishment of a dedicated professional association - Società Italiana 
Medici-Manager (Italian Society of Medical Managers) - open to all hybrid professional managers 
but specifically founded by and for PH doctors. Hence, this brief history reveals the emergence of a 
specialised pathway of medical management in the Italian healthcare context, linked to the PH 
profession. However, while this model of organising profession is often viewed by policy makers as 
advantageous for improving the effectiveness of management decision making in hospitals, we 
know little about its impact in practice.  
 
Data and methodology 
Sample and data 
To investigate the concerns raised so far, we focus on clinical hybrids occupying the position of 
Direttore Generale (hereafter, the CEO) within Italian public hospitals. The study concentrates on 
autonomous public hospitals, therefore excluding those managed by local health organisations 
(Sarto et al. 2016). The latter are less autonomous organisations with CEOs having far less room for 
independent decision making in hospital management (Nuti et al. 2016; Longo et al. 2011; Ferrè et 
al. 2014). The more autonomous public hospitals comprise general (Aziende Ospedaliere), teaching 
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(Aziende Ospedaliero-Universitarie) and research (Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Speciale) 
hospitals. 
To address our main hypotheses, the study unfolded in two main stages. First, we explored 
the impact of all CEOs with clinical backgrounds on quality and efficiency outcomes. Second, we 
looked specifically at the performance implications of CEOs with a PH background (our proxy for 
generalist hybrids). Due to the lack of a central repository of information on the Italian SSN 
hospital governance, we constructed a unique dataset by manually working through the official 
documentation published by the Ministry of Health, the Regions and any other relevant information 
accessible on each hospital website. The personal information on hospital CEOs and their area of 
expertise was retrieved from their curriculum vitae, their appointment decrees and the Italian 
official register of doctors. In terms of outcomes, data on service quality was taken from the 
‘Hospital Discharge Cards’ (Schede di Dimissione Ospedaliera) database published by the Ministry 
of Health on its website. Lastly, information relating to hospital financial performance (efficiency) 
was gathered from the publicly available hospital annual reports and accounts.  
The total population of public hospitals in the Ministry of Health database amounted to 105 
organisations censored in 2011. This was the last available information at the time of the research. 
Some organisations had to be excluded as mergers, de-mergers and changes in ownership status 
occurred during the period under investigation. The remaining missing hospitals were not included 
in the study due to the absence of reliable information on their top executive position. As a result, 
the final sample comprised of 90 hospitals in 2008, 92 hospitals in 2009 and 96 hospitals in 2010. 
All PH doctors included in our sample had qualified after the 1995 reform, which meant they had 
undertaken the more standardised form of management education described earlier.  
 
Dependent variables 
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As noted, our main dependent variable (hospital performance) was measured in relation to both the 
quality of services provided and financial efficiency. The rationale for this dual measure is linked to 
the assumptions discussed earlier about the possible contribution of clinical hybrids in general and 
organising professionals (generalists) in particular both to the core business of health services 
(service quality) and to goals which are more central to management (financial efficiency).  
Service quality 
To measure service quality, we employed process indicators relating to the delivery of care. These 
indicators have been sourced from the performance evaluation system elaborated by the ‘Scuola 
Superiore Sant’Anna’ of Pisa (Nuti et al. 2012) and have been used in prior research focused on the 
Italian SSN (Vainieri et al. 2017; Nuti et al. 2016). Specifically, we focused on two dimensions - 
the length of care and its appropriateness – both widely accepted indicators of service quality. 
Our first process quality measure, the length of care (LOC), was captured using two 
indicators: the ‘pre-surgery length of stay’, and the ‘overall length of stay’. The pre-surgery length 
of stay includes the average number of days between the patient admission date and the date when 
the surgery is performed. The length of stay represents the average number of days between 
admission date and final discharge of the patient. Essentially, both indicators measure the hospital 
ability to effectively organise its activities for the patient benefit. Using principal component factor 
analysis (PCFA), we identified the factor comprising the two indicators and then dichotomised the 
variable at its median value (DeCoster et al. 2009). As the value of the (pre-surgery and ordinary) 
length of stay factor was inversely proportional to the efficiency of care dimension (i.e. a higher 
composite value equals lower efficiency), the dummy variable assumes value 1 (better 
performance) if the factor value is lower than the median, meaning that the composite length of stay 
for each hospital is lower than the one of the hospital population in our sample.  
Second, the appropriateness of care (APPROP) measures the hospital ability to perform 
clinically appropriate interventions for (medical and surgical) patients (Nuti et al. 2012; 2016). 
Page 12 of 35
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpxm  Email: Isobel.speedman@ed.ac.uk
Public Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
13 
  
Medical appropriateness was measured using two ratios: (i) the ratio between the number of short 
(0-2 days) hospital medical hospitalisations and the total number of medical hospitalisations; and 
(ii) the ratio between the number of hospital medical hospitalisations with diagnostic aim and the 
total number of medical hospitalisations. These two ratios capture the organisation compliance with 
the National Healthcare Agreement of 2010 in avoiding unnecessary short ordinary hospitalisation 
for patients who could be diagnosed or treated in other care settings (e.g. outpatient clinics). In both 
cases, a lower raw value indicates more appropriate care. Surgical appropriateness, on the other 
hand, was measured using the ratio between the number of hospitalisations with medical diagnostic 
related groups discharged from surgical departments and the total number of patients discharged 
from surgical department. As such, this indicator also captures outcomes quality, where a lower raw 
value is associated with more accurate diagnoses of patients.  
Similar to the LOC measure, we used PCFA to identify a factor that comprised the two 
appropriateness indicators. Given the presenc  of outliers and non-linearity of relationship between 
input and outcome variables, we dichotomised the appropriateness variable at the median value 
(DeCoster et al. 2009). As the value of the appropriateness factor was inversely proportional to the 
performance dimension (i.e. a higher composite value equals lower appropriateness of care), the 
dummy variable assumes value 1 if the factor value is lower than the median. Therefore, a dummy 
equal to 1 measures better performance in terms of surgical and medical appropriateness. 
 
Financial efficiency 
To measure hospital financial performance, we used two accounting indicators: the net operating 
margin ratio (OP_MARG_RAT), which is a measure of the ability to generate profit by the 
organisation in relation to its operating revenues (Eldenburg and Krishnan 2003); and the ratio of 
total expenses on hospital beds (OP_EFF), which represents a size adjusted measure of hospital 
financial efficiency (Succi and Alexander 1999). The OP_MARG_RAT indicator is positively 
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related to the profit dimension and so its increase indicates an improvement in terms of the profit 
generated. On the other hand, the raw value of OP_EFF is inversely related to the costs structure of 
the hospital operations, meaning that when the relative (to the number of beds) costs are higher the 
hospital is less efficient. Thus, to make it more immediately understandable for the reader, we use 
the negative value of the size adjusted total expenses (and similarly for all the other variables 
included in the regression model). 
 
Explanatory variables 
To estimate the impact of different types of hybrid professional managers on hospital performance, 
we looked at the educational background of the CEO. First, to address Hypotheses 1 and 2 we 
distinguished between CEOs with clinical educational background (essentially, all individuals with 
a degree in medicine) and those ones with a non-clinical background (CLIN_CEO). Second, to 
address Hypothesis 3, among clinical CEOs we distinguished doctors with a clinical specialisation 
in PH (PH_CEO), our proxy for organising professionals, from doctors with any other medical 
specialisation. As a further test, to fully assess the relative contribution of clinical hybrids on 
performance, we focused on the impact of CEOs with non-clinical backgrounds. Here, we 
differentiated between those non-clinical CEOs with a degree in administrative sciences 
(Law/Political Science) (ADM_CEO) - traditionally influential in the Italian SSN (Sarto et al. 2016) 
- and those without. 
A number of control variables were included in the model. First, we looked at whether 
acting CEOs had previous professional experiences in the same role within healthcare organisations 
(BACK_CEO) (Fattore et al. 2013), assuming that this would have provided individuals with 
greater knowledge and ability to deal with the requirements of the role. Additionally, we considered 
the length of tenure of the CEO within the same organisation (TENURE), on the basis that longer 
tenure would yield a better understanding of the organisational resources and greater familiarity 
Page 14 of 35
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rpxm  Email: Isobel.speedman@ed.ac.uk
Public Management Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
15 
  
with other managers. In terms of organisational characteristics, we distinguished hospitals in terms 
of their size with regard to the total number of beds available (SIZE) and case mix, as a proxy for 
the complexity of care provided (CASEMIX). The case mix captures the characteristics of patients, 
their associated conditions and diagnoses received, and the related treatments delivered by a 
hospital such that higher values of the variable indicate greater complexity. Following a similar line 
of reasoning, hospitals were differentiated according to the population age, determined by the mean 
age of the population served (POP_AGE). Older patients can potentially require more complex 
treatments and are more prone to multi-morbidity issues. Finally, hospitals were differentiated 
according to their status, by distinguishing general hospitals from teaching (TEACH_HOSP) and 
research (RES_HOSP) hospitals (Veronesi et al. 2015). 
 
Analysis 
We separately estimated three empirical models for each performance indicator. The models 
employing the financial performance measures as dependent variables were estimated using data for 
a 3-year period (2008-2010). By contrast, the quality performance analyses were carried out for 2-
year periods (2008-2009 for APPROP and 2009-2010 for LOC). As the quality performance 
indicators were dichotomous variables, here we employed a pooled logistic regression estimation 
technique. Conversely, because of the continuous nature of the financial performance proxies, we 
used pooled OLS regressions. In both cases we included year dummy variables in the models. We 
estimated analogous specifications of the relevant regression model for each explanatory variable - 
CLIN_CEO, PH_CEO and ADM_CEO. 
 
Findings 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics related to the variables employed in our analyses. Firstly, it 
can be seen that CEOs with clinical expertise were more likely to lead Italian public hospitals 
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(59.4%) than those with non-clinical expertise (40.6%). Interestingly, PH doctors entailed about 
29.9% of the CEOs’ sample and roughly 50% of the hybrid professional CEOs. As far as previous 
experience in the role is concerned, 38.8% of CEOs had already occupied this position in the past. 
Finally, CEO’s average tenure was around 3 years. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Table 3 reports the Pearson bivariate correlations of the variables employed, which allows 
checking for possible multicollinearity. As a rule of thumb, a problem of multicollinearity subsists 
if the pair-wise correlation coefficients between two regressors is high, normally in excess of 0.8 
(Gujarati 2004). As shown in Table 3, the coefficients for each of the explanatory variables in the 
regression models ranged from -0.708 to 0.552, hence below the threshold. We also tested for 
multicollinearity through Variance Inflation Factor analysis. All VIF values were within acceptable 
limits for the variables employed (<10) and, therefore, we did not exclude any variable. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Tables 4 and 5 respectively show the results of the pooled logistic and the OLS regression 
analyses testing the effect of CEO human capital on the quality of services provided and financial 
performance dimensions. Specifically, models (1) and (4) tested the effect of CEO clinical expertise 
on hospital performance (Hypotheses 1 and 2), while models (2) and (5) investigated the effect of 
PH specialisation (Hypothesis 3). Finally, as an additional test, models (3) and (6) assessed the 
effect on performance of CEOs with administrative backgrounds. Within these models, each 
performance indicator is individually regressed on the different explanatory variables. As a 
robustness test, we also ran the regression models considering the continuous values of length and 
appropriateness of care, yielding comparable results (APPENDIX A). 
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TABLES 4 AND 5 HERE 
 
Starting with the impact of hybrid professional CEOs as opposed to non-clinical CEOs, the 
results were fairly unambiguous. As reported in Table 4, specifications (1) and (4) of the regression 
models highlighted a positive and highly significant influence of clinical CEOs both on the length 
of care (LOC) (β = 1.590, p <0.01) and on the surgical and medical appropriateness (APPROP) (β = 
0.888, p <0.05). This provides substantial support for Hypothesis 1, consistent with other studies of 
hospital boards (see, for example, Goodall 2011; Veronesi et al. 2013). However, with regard to the 
financial performance dimension (see Table 5), clinical expertise seemed to have the opposite effect 
on the profitability and efficiency of the hospital. In particular, models (1) and (4) respectively 
suggested a negative and significant effect of a clinical CEO on the operating margin (β = -0.035, p 
<0.1) and on the financial efficiency (β = -17.163, p <0.1) factors. Therefore, our findings also offer 
strong support for Hypothesis 2, with hospitals run by clinical hybrid CEOs under-performing in 
terms of financial goals.  
The significance of these findings is further revealed by tests looking at the impact of CEOs 
with administrative backgrounds. As one might expect, specification (3) of the regression model in 
Table 5 shows a positive and significant effect of these CEOs on the operating margin ratio 
(although this was not the same for the operating efficiency prox , whose coefficient was 
insignificant). However, with regard to quality, specification (3) of the model (see Table 4) 
highlights a statistically significant negative effect on the length of care (LOC) (β = -1.249, p <0.01) 
and a negative (but not significant at the customary levels) effect on the appropriateness of care 
(APPROP) (specification 6). Such findings highlight the relative benefits of appointing clinical 
hybrids to hospital CEO roles, as opposed to individuals without clinical expertise, especially with 
regard to quality.  
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Regarding the impact of PH specialisation (our proxy for generalist clinical hybrids), the 
results were mixed. As can be seen from Table 4, we found that the coefficient of the variable 
PH_CEO was significantly and positively related only to one quality outcome: length of care (LOC) 
(β = 1.066, p <0.01). Conversely, PH specialisation did not seem to generate the same effect on the 
appropriateness of care (the coefficient was still positive but not statistically significant at the 
customary levels). With regard to the financial performance dimension, both specifications (2) and 
(5) of the regression model (reported in Table 5) did not reveal statistically significant coefficients 
for the variable PH_CEO. As such, the analysis offers only limited support for Hypothesis 3 with 
regard to one performance measure: service quality. Nevertheless, it also suggests that while CEOs 
with a PH specialisation are not having a positive impact on financial efficiency, in contrast to ‘all 
clinical hybrids’ (Hypothesis 2) this impact was not expressed in negative terms.  
As for the control variables, hospital size had a negative effect on the quality of the service 
provided both in terms of length and appropriateness, although it did impact (positively) on 
financial efficiency. The proxy for operational complexity (case mix) had mixed implications, being 
negative for length of stay, but positive for appropriateness of care and financial efficiency. 
Surprisingly, teaching and research statuses did not have any significant effect on the quality of 
care, while CEO tenure also had a variable impact on our key dimensions of performance. 
As a further robustness test, we sought to exclude the possibility that our findings were 
affected by endogeneity problems due to reverse causality. To do this, we re-ran the pooled 
regressions by using lag values of the independent variables employed (see APPENDIX B). Here, 
the assumption is that CEOs would not be able to predict the hospital performance at time t from the 
information set available at time t-1, thus suggesting that the performance (at time t) is not 
explained by the tendency of CEO with certain backgrounds to be appointed on high performing 
hospitals. The results of this robustness test were qualitatively similar to the ones reported for the 
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main analysis. The findings of the base line models were also confirmed when the regressions were 
re-run using sector-adjusted performance values (see APPENDIX C). 
 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Our main point of departure in this paper centred on debates about the impact of hybrid professional 
managers on performance, specifically CEOs in healthcare. Drawing loosely on ideas from board 
human capital theory (Kor and Sundaramurthy 2009), the literature makes various assumptions 
about this performance impact. On the one hand, it is assumed that the ‘sector specific’ knowledge 
of hybrids will be beneficial in terms of service quality outcomes (Hypothesis 1), while, on the 
other hand, the consequences may be less positive for financial efficiency (Hypothesis 2). A further 
question relates to possible differences within the category of clinical hybrids and, in particular, 
whether it makes a difference if hybrids have acquired more generalist human capital (Datta and 
Iskandar‐Datta 2014) from earlier training and socialisation in management (Noordegraaf 2015). 
Here the assumption (captured in Hypothesis 3) is that generalist clinical hybrids may be more 
effective in balancing both quality and efficiency goals.  
Focusing on Italian public hospitals, our analysis provided strong support for both 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. We found that clinical CEOs in general are having positive effects on hospital 
quality outcomes. This lends support to the assumptions of board human capital theory regarding 
the likely impact of sector specific knowledge and the findings of many previous studies (for 
example, Goodall 2011; Veronesi et al. 2013). Sector specific knowledge facilitates what Goodall 
and Bäker (2015) term ‘expert leadership’, helping to improve both the quality of decision making 
(informed by understanding of the core business of healthcare) and the credibility (and legitimacy) 
of senior managers. By contrast, our analysis suggests that hybrid professional managers perform 
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far less well in terms of financial efficiency goals (Hypothesis 2). Implied here is that hybrid CEOs 
may lack the capabilities of non-clinical managers to make effective decisions in this area 
(Kirkpatrick et al. 2017). It is also possible that their primary contribution to improving quality may 
come at a cost in terms of financial control and profitability. The latter is suggested by the 
statistically negative association between clinical CEOs and financial management reported in 
Table 5.  
However, the results were less conclusive with regard to Hypothesis 3, concerning the 
impact of CEOs with a PH background (our proxy for organising professionals with more generalist 
expertise). While these CEOs still had a positive effect on one measure of service quality (length of 
stay), they had no (significant) impact on hospital financial performance. Therefore, we found no 
strong evidence to support the view that clinical hybrids with generalist human capital are 
substantially more likely to reconcile professional and managerial demands. All that can be said is 
that the impact of CEOs with a PH background on financial goals was not significantly negative - as 
was the case with all clinical hybrids. Tentatively, this suggests that PH doctors may be able to 
leverage their sector specific (medical) knowledge (Ford-Eickhoff et al. 2011) in ways that help 
raise quality without at least undermining efficiency. Given how cash strapped are many healthcare 
systems around the world, avoiding the trade-off between quality and costs should in itself be seen 
as a positive contribution of these organising professionals.  
These findings contribute to theory, research and policy in a number of ways. First, they add 
to the growing literature looking on how hybrid professionals on the governing board of public 
sector organisations shape performance (Sarto and Veronesi 2016). Our results are consistent with 
earlier studies, highlighting the positive impact that hybrids – in our case, clinicians – seem to have 
on service quality outcomes (Goodall 2011; Jiang et al. 2009). However, they also offer a more 
nuanced picture. Unlike previous studies, our results emphasise the mixed consequences of placing 
clinical hybrids in key executive roles, specifically with regard to their negative effect on financial 
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outcomes (see Veronesi et al. 2014 for competing findings in the English NHS). More tentatively, 
the Italian experience suggests that prior management development and socialisation of clinical 
hybrids is important. While it is not having a significant impact on performance overall, our 
analysis shows that hybrids with a generalist PH background are nevertheless distinctive in their 
effects. Therefore, an important contribution of this study is to illustrate the differential impact of 
hybrid clinical managers on performance and how this, in turn, is linked to different types of human 
capital (specific vs. generalist) within this category.  
A related contribution is to more specific debates about the consequences of increasing 
investments in management development and the emergence of new cadres of ‘organising 
professionals’. Looked at from a wider perspective, these policies might be viewed as an attempt to 
bridge the gap between ‘professional’, ‘commercial’ and ‘managerial’ logics in healthcare, and 
other public services. By integrating management training and socialisation at an earlier stage in 
professional careers, the practices of generalist hybrids may go beyond ‘pragmatic collaboration’ 
between logics (Denis et al. 2015). Parallels can also be drawn here with Skelcher and Smith’s 
(2015, 440) notion of ‘blended’ hybridisation in which there is a ‘synergistic incorporation of 
elements of existing logics into a new and contextually specific logic’. To some extent, our results 
lend support for this conclusion, suggesting that PH doctors may be slightly more adept in 
managing cost quality trade-offs (see Noordegraaf 2015). However, as we noted earlier, the strategy 
of developing a cadre of organising professionals in Italian public hospitals has not been 
transformational. Contrary to the assumptions made in board human capital theory, it seems that the 
expertise of these generalist hybrids is having only a partial impact on organisational outcomes. 
Given the nature of our data, it is possible to only speculate about the reasons for this limited 
impact. One possibility is that clinical hybrids who have invested more time and energy in 
developing management capabilities are less able than other doctors to leverage sector specific 
knowledge. As Christopher Pollitt (1990, 438) once observed, ‘professional experience, 
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unexercised, is a decaying asset’. Equally, it is possible that organising professionals have less 
credibility amongst their peers, viewed as having dual commitments (Croft et al. 2015) or being 
labelled as a ‘lower status’ occupation through their association with management. In this regard, 
the specific context of Italy may also be significant. It is notable, for example, that, in Italy, 
attempts to develop hybrids with generalist expertise have focused primarily on PH doctors who, 
according to most international rankings of medical specialisation, find themselves at the bottom (or 
close to it) of the status pecking order (Norredam and Album 2007). Related to this is the possibility 
that, in Italy, the cultural divide between medicine and management has tended to be particularly 
strong in the past (Lega 2008), although it is hard to say whether this is more or less true than other 
European healthcare systems.  
Turning to policy implications, our findings are less clear. On the one hand, they support the 
general thrust of policies aimed at enhancing clinical leadership, showing how clinical hybrid CEOs 
may add value in terms of service quality (Ham et al. 2011). However, at the same time they raise 
questions about the effectiveness of investments in early career management development and 
socialisation for doctors (Busari et al. 2011). Contrary to more critical assessments (see for example 
McGivern et al. 2015), our results suggest that these policies are having a small, albeit limited, 
impact on performance, helping to balance quality and efficiency objectives. But, whether these 
marginal gains are considered to be worthwhile will depend on the expectations of policy makers 
and on what outcomes they value. While the PH specialisation is associated with satisfactory (but 
unspectacular) performance in service quality, as we noted earlier, it may help to minimise the risks 
of financial under-performance. In this regard, PH specialisation may be perceived as valuable, 
especially if the minimum objective of governments is to create what Llewellyn and Northcote 
(2005, 555) term ‘average hospitals’, which are ‘cheaper to run and easier to control than highly 
differentiated ones’.  
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When drawing these conclusions, it is important to note certain caveats and directions for 
future work. An obvious concern is the need for more longitudinal research to strengthen our 
conclusions about the assumed direction of causality – whether it is the human capital of CEOs 
impacting on performance or vice-versa? Although our robustness tests increase the confidence in 
the assumed relationships, access to further years of data would be useful. Second, we clearly need 
to know more about the internal dynamics of the governance of Italian public hospitals to better 
understand why there is a relationship between different types of human capital and performance. 
While we can speculate about the ability and motivation of hybrid professional managers to 
influence strategic decisions, further research investigating how actors enact different leadership 
styles would be advantageous. Work of this kind might also uncover relevant differences in clinical 
orientations and identity of CEOs, which further impact on their practice. Third, the analysis could 
be re-run using alternative performance measures. Although length of stay is a useful quality 
indicator – notably in the Italian SSN where bed blocking is historically a significant concern (Nuti 
et al. 2012) – it could also signal inferior quality if patients are forced to leave prematurely. Lastly, 
we need to look beyond the Italian case to fully understand the nature and consequences of 
organising professionals. Indeed, Italy may be distinctive in a number of respects. It has been noted, 
for example, that local and regional political networks play an important role in shaping the 
appointment of hospital managers (Sarto et al. 2016) and their ability to leverage resources (such as 
capital and HR investments) (Fattore et al. 2012). The focus on PH only rather than broader clinical 
expertise might also be significant as we noted earlier. Either way, there is scope to extend this 
research to other contexts to better understand how different patterns of hybrid professional 
management are emerging and their impact. 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1 The development of PH doctors 
PERIOD  MILESTONES 
XVIII century  Hygiene emerges as independent discipline that combines prevention and organising of 
health provision due to Peter Franck’s treatise on health. 
First half of 
XIX century 
 Doctors with expertise in hygiene start to assume relevant roles within hospitals in 
public servant positions. 
1938  The Petragnani Law introduces the role of hospital medical director and requires the 
mandatory expertise in Hygiene and PH to access this position. 
1968  The Mariotti Law expands the management duties of medical directors by incorporating 
activities such as control over personnel and financial oversight. 
1960s-1970s  A post-graduate specialist training in hygiene and PH is established in Italian medical 
schools. 
1978  The establishment of the SSN sparkles a growing demand for managerial expertise. 
1990s  NPM reforms make compulsory specialisation in PH for CEO and hospital medical 
director roles. 
1995  The curriculum of doctors specialising in PH is standardised at the national level with 
more emphasis on organisational competences and managerial skills. 
2005  The reform of universities leads to the mandatory introduction of a teaching module in 
Health Economics, Management and Organisation in medical curricula as well as an 
extra-curricular internship in senior management roles. 
2006  PH doctors found the Italian Society of Medical Managers. 
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TABLE 2 Variable Explanations and Descriptive Statistics  
VARIABLES DEFINITION N MEAN S.D. MIN MAX 
LOC Dummy transformation of length of 
care factor (equal to 1 if lower than 
the median of the factor) 
179 0.497 0.501   
APPROP Dummy transformation of 
Appropriateness factor (equal to 1 if 
lower than the median of the factor) 
177 0.503 0.501   
OP_MARG_RAT Continuous. EBITDA per Operating 
Revenues ratio 
262 1.075 0.136 0.911 1.673 
OP_EFF Continuous. Operating Expenses per 
Total Beds ratio 
271 339.951 97.995 179.497 930.675 
CLIN_CEO Dummy equal to 1 if the CEO is a 
clinician 
278 0.594 0.492   
PH_CEO Dummy equal to 1(0) if the CEO has 
PH (non-clinical/other clinical) 
background 
284 0.299 0.459   
ADM_CEO Dummy equal to 1(0) if the CEO has 
administrative (other clinical and 
non-clinical) background 
285 0.211 0.408   
BACK_CEO Dummy equal to 1 if the CEO has 
experiences in top executive positions 
263 0.388 0.488   
TENURE Continuous. N° of years of staying in 
hospital CEO’s position 
278 3.057 1.967 0.416 11.258 
SIZE Continuous. Natural Log of hospital 
Beds 
271 6.429 0.680 4.331 7.537 
CASEMIX Continuous. Hospital case mix 272 1.079 0.173 0.66 1.57 
POP_AGE Continuous. Average age of 
population within hospital 
municipality 
285 44.096 2.066 40.098 47.806 
TEACH_HOSP Dummy equal to 1 for Teaching 
Hospitals 
285 0.270 0.445   
RES_HOSP Dummy equal to 1 for Research 
Hospitals 
285 0.123 0.329   
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TABLE 3 Pearson bivariate correlations 
 VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 LOC 1     
2 APPROP 0.350*** 1     
3 OP_MARG_RAT -0.244*** 0.149** 1     
4 OP_EFF
 
0.111 -0.381*** -0.277*** 1     
5 CLIN_CEO 0.244*** 0.111 -0.067 -0.121** 1     
6 PH_CEO 0.148** -0.074 -0.037 -0.029 0.552*** 1     
7 ADM_CEO -0.180** 0.025 0.239 0.089 -0.634 -0.338 1    
8 BACK_CEO -0.032 0.091 0.134* -0.082 -0.085 0.026 0.047 1    
9 TENURE 0.060 0.210*** 0.059 -0.017 -0.007 0.014 0.167*** -0.007 1    
1 SIZE -0.117 -0.303*** -0.098 0.439*** -0.028 0.158*** 0.057 0.302*** 0.165*** 1    
1 CASEMIX -0.262*** 0.250*** 0.147** -0.518*** 0.068 0.086 -0.041 0.262*** 0.002 -0.030 1    
1 POP_AGE 0.146* -0.082 -0.221 -0.088 0.089 0.169*** -0.103* 0.182*** -0.059 0.219*** 0.249*** 1   
1 TEACH_HOSP -0.084 0.124 0.085 -0.007 0.061 0.091 0.054 0.156** 0.019 0.244*** 0.221*** 0.082 1  
1 RES_HOSP 0.097 0.262*** 0.149** -0.389*** 0.161*** -0.058 -0.036 -0.081 -0.081 -0.708*** 0.184*** 0.002 -0.228*** 1 
Significance level indicated by P-value: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
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4 
TABLE 4 Logistic regression of service quality 
VARIABLES LOC  APPROP 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
CLIN_CEO 1.590***    0.888**   
  0.432    0.418   
PH_CEO  1.066**    0.039  
   0.420    0.446  
ADM_CEO   -1.249***    -0.893 
   0.480    0.545 
BACK_CEO 0.832* 0.501 0.528  0.542 0.509 0.506 
  0.445 0.410 0.414  0.484 0.470 0.475 
TENURE 0.183* 0.168* 0.206**  0.391*** 0.357*** 0.432*** 
  0.104 0.101 0.103  0.114 0.110 0.124 
SIZE -1.373*** -1.090** -0.954  -1.747*** -1.665*** -1.617*** 
  0.496 0.456 0.445  0.547 0.524 0.526 
CASEMIX -7.267*** -6.499*** -6.806***  4.700*** 4.480*** 4.762** 
  1.616 1.515 1.528  1.413 1.366 1.392 
POP_AGE 0.390*** 0.329*** 0.349***  -0.162 -0.174 -0.197* 
  0.111 0.105 0.107  0.116 0.114 0.117 
TEACH_HOSP -0.071 0.001 0.256  0.616 0.659 0.819* 
  0.441 0.427 0.426  0.462 0.464 0.458 
RES_HOSP 0.306 1.145 1.247     
  0.975 0.934 0.934     
OBSERVATIONS 164 164 164  140 139 140 
Wald chi2 49.88*** 41.38*** 41.780***  42.95*** 38.55*** 41.030*** 
Pseudo R2 0.220 0.182 0.184  0.222 0.201 0.212 
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Significance level indicated by P-value: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
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5 
TABLE 5 OLS regression of financial performance 
VARIABLES OP_MARG_RAT  OP_EFF
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
CLIN_CEO -0.035*    -17.163*   
  0.019    9.663   
PH_CEO  -0.010    -9.297  
   0.020    10.237  
ADM_CEO   0.092***    16.427 
   0.023    11.721 
BACK_CEO 0.049** 0.050** 0.056***  -26.147** -25.115** -24.552** 
  0.021 0.021 0.020  10.576 10.630 10.582 
TENURE 0.005 0.005 -0.000  -4.803* -4.780 -5.505** 
  0.005 0.005 0.005  2.538 2.557 2.598 
SIZE 0.004 0.002 -0.001  81.886*** 80.380*** 79.818*** 
  0.020 0.021 0.020  10.335 10.405 10.282 
CASEMIX 0.096* 0.097* 0.094*  -256.460*** -256.855*** -256.157*** 
  0.057 0.057 0.055  29.439 29.644 29.515 
POP_AGE -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.019***  -1.972 -1.688 -1.603 
  0.005 0.005 0.005  2.458 2.492 2.474 
TEACH_HOSP 0.030 0.029 0.016  0.801 -0.124 -2.842 
  0.022 0.023 0.021  11.138 11.269 11.197 
RES_HOSP 0.100** 0.085** 0.091**  10.150 2.204 2.398 
  0.042 0.041 0.040  21.200 20.787 20.631 
OBSERVATIONS 228 227 228  247 246 247 
F 4.13*** 3.75*** 5.580***  24.55*** 23.97*** 24.31*** 
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.109 0.168  0.489 0.484 0.487 
YEAR 
DUMMIES 
YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Significance level indicated by P-value: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
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APPENDIX A 
OLS regression of Length of care and Appropriateness continuous factors
a 
VARIABLES LENGHT OF CARE   APPROPRIATENESS 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
CLIN_CEO -0.332**    0.112   
  0.131    0.137   
PH_CEO  -0.136    -0.216  
   0.139    0.142  
ADM_CEO   0.322**    -0.233 
  0.157    0.177 
BACK_CEO -0.166 -0.124 -0.127  -0.002 -0.007 -0.018 
  0.141 0.142 0.141  0.151 0.151 0.151 
TENURE 0.002 0.001 -0.008  0.040 0.034 0.054 
  0.034 0.034 0.034  0.036 0.036 0.038 
SIZE 0.554*** 0.509*** 0.497***  -0.444*** -0.435*** -0.427*** 
  0.149 0.151 0.148  0.140 0.140 0.139 
CASEMIX 2.789*** 2.778*** 2.820***  1.745*** 1.706*** 1.760*** 
  0.425 0.433 0.428  0.400 0.399 0.399 
POP_AGE -0.152*** -0.148*** -0.147***  -0.039 -0.034 -0.044 
  0.033 0.034 0.034  0.034 0.035 0.034 
TEACH_HOSP -0.029 -0.055 -0.110  0.155 0.188 0.192 
  0.148 0.151 0.150  0.156 0.156 0.155 
RES_HOSP -0.264 -0.463 -0.445  1.522*** 1.602*** 1.562*** 
  0.310 0.304 0.300  0.317 0.308 0.307 
OBSERVATIONS 164 164 164  152 151 152 
F 8.74*** 8.74*** 9.28***  13.49*** 13.81*** 13.71** 
Adjusted R2 0.300 0.300 0.314  0.427 0.435 0.431 
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Significance level indicated by P-value: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
a 
The factors are inversely proportional to the performance dimensions. 
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APPENDIX B 
Robustness Test: Logistic regressions with lagged values 
VARIABLES LOC  APPROP  OP_MARG_RAT  OP_EFF 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
CLIN_CEO 1.367***    0.881    -0.033    -11.326   
  0.417    0.590    0.025    9.826   
PH_CEO  0.906**    -0.161    0.010    -4.498  
   0.420    0.668    0.026    10.476  
ADM_CEO   -0.995*    -1.080    0.089***    15.873 
   0.508    0.748    0.030    12.441 
BACK_CEO 0.847* 0.628 0.672  0.634 0.671 0.649  0.035 0.036 0.039  -8.411 -7.724 -7.3060 
  0.452 0.427 0.428  0.698 0.687 0.689  0.029 0.029 0.028  10.918 10.970 10.879 
TENURE 0.097 0.058 0.120  0.419** 0.412** 0.498***  0.008 0.009 0.003  -0.446 -0.099 -1.315 
  0.106 0.101 0.109  0.171 0.170 0.191  0.007 0.007 0.007  2.637 2.639 2.793 
SIZE -0.956** -0.807* -0.672  -1.760** -1.779** -1.677**  0.009 0.004 0.004  53.668*** 51.937*** 52.041*** 
  0.480 0.453 0.444  0.830 0.813 0.812  0.030 0.030 0.029  11.276 11.314 11.148 
CASEMIX -6.665*** -6.366*** -6.299***  4.970** 4.625** 5.230**  0.185** 0.187** 0.183  -331.584*** -332.339*** -332.158*** 
  1.566 1.512 1.508  2.077 1.984 2.070  0.077 0.078 0.075  30.792 31.014 30.754 
POP_AGE 0.339*** 0.281*** 0.293***  -0.220 -0.245 -0.277  -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.021  1.239 1.414 1.695 
  0.110 0.107 0.107  0.172 0.170 0.176  0.007 0.007 0.007  2.631 2.668 2.645 
TEACH_HOSP -0.270 -0.233 0.013  0.376 0.377 0.577  0.018 0.014 0.004  5.474 4.610 2.699 
  0.459 0.449 0.440  0.677 0.690 0.667  0.031 0.031 0.030  11.425 11.583 11.449 
RES_HOSP 0.221 1.038 0.983      0.123 0.103** 0.115  -32.764 -39.055* -37.891 
  0.955 0.915 0.907      0.059** 0.058 0.056  22.507 22.004 21.782 
OBSERVATIONS 157 156 157  69 68 69  143 142 143  162 161 162 
LR chi2 42.18*** 36.25*** 34.43***  21.59*** 19.87*** 21.46***  3.50*** 3.27*** 4.44**  28.97*** 28.46*** 29.06*** 
R2 0.194 0.168 0.158  0.227 0.212 0.225  0.137 0.126 0.179  0.610 0.607 0.611 
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Significance level indicated by P-value: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
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APPENDIX C 
Robustness Test: OLS regressions with sector-adjusted performance indicators
a
 
VARIABLES LENGHT OF CARE  APPROPRIATENESS  OP_MARG_RAT  OP_EFF 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
CLIN_CEO -0.332**    0.112    -0.035*    -17.163*   
  0.131    0.137    0.019    9.663   
PH_CEO  -0.136    -0.216    -0.010    -9.297  
   0.139    0.142    0.020    10.237  
ADM_CEO   0.322***    -0.233    0.092***    16.427 
   0.157    0.177    0.023    11.721 
BACK_CEO -0.166 -0.124 -0.127  -0.002 -0.007 -0.018  0.049** 0.050** 0.056***  -26.147** -25.115** -24.552** 
  0.141 0.142 0.141  0.151 0.151 0.151  0.021 0.021 0.020  10.576 10.630 10.582 
TENURE 0.002 0.001 -0.008  0.040 0.034 0.054  0.005 0.005 -0.000  -4.803* -4.780* -5.505** 
  0.034 0.034 0.034  0.036 0.036 0.038  0.005 0.005 0.005  2.538 2.557 2.598 
SIZE 0.554*** 0.509*** 0.497***  -0.444*** -0.435*** -0.427***  0.004 0.002 -0.001  81.886*** 80.380*** 79.818*** 
  0.149 0.151 0.148  0.140 0.140 0.139  0.020 0.021 0.020  10.335 10.405 10.282 
CASEMIX 2.789*** 2.778*** 2.820***  1.745*** 1.706*** 1.760***  0.096* 0.097* 0.094  -256.460*** -256.855*** -256.157*** 
  0.425 0.433 0.428  0.400 0.399 0.399  0.057 0.057 0.055  29.439 29.644 29.515 
POP_AGE -0.152*** -0.148*** -0.147***  -0.039 -0.034 -0.044  -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.019***  -1.972 -1.688 -1.603 
  0.033 0.034 0.034  0.034 0.035 0.034  0.005 0.005 0.005  2.458 2.492 2.474 
TEACH_HOSP -0.029** -0.055 -0.110  0.155 0.188 0.192  0.030 0.029 0.016  0.801 -0.124 -2.842 
  0.148 0.151 0.150  0.156 0.156 0.155  0.022 0.023 0.022  11.138 11.269 11.197 
RES_HOSP -0.264 -0.463 -0.445  1.522*** 1.602*** 1.562***  0.100** 0.085** 0.091**  10.150 2.204 2.398 
  0.310 0.304 0.300  0.317 0.308 0.307  0.042 0.041 0.040  21.200 20.787 20.631 
OBSERVATIONS 164 164 164  152 151 152  228 227 228  247 246 247 
F 9.66*** 8.74*** 9.28***  13.49*** 13.81*** 13.71***  4.13*** 3.75*** 5.58***  24.55*** 23.97*** 24.31*** 
R2 0.323 0.300 0.314  0.427 0.435 0.431  0.121 0.109 0.168  0.489 0.484 0.487 
YEAR DUMMIES YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Significance level indicated by P-value: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
a 
LENGHT OF CARE and APPROPRIATENESS are continuous factors and are inversely proportional to the performance dimensions. 
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